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Abstract 
This thesis merges two large bodies of literature – that concerned with the effect of 
regime type on institutional quality, and research on the middle classes’ effects on 
economy and society at large. With the purpose of providing an answer to: How the 
size of the middle class affects Quality of Government, and if the size of middle class 
is a determinant for democracy’s impact on Quality of Government?    
I provide a theoretical framework that outlines a “middle class particularism” in 
terms of their demand of Quality of Government, which differentiates the middle 
class from both the rich and the poor. I argue that their demand – driven by low 
future discount rates, expectations on the state, their mitigating role between the 
upper and lower class, and by their values – interacts differently with the supply 
side in democracies and autocracies, because of the regime type’s different 
institutional natures. In this first large-N study on the relationship between the 
middle class and Quality of Government, I employ a novel operationalization of the 
middle class – that capture those who can afford to purchase a car, a significantly 
expensive non-essential item, from which an estimation of the elite is deducted.   
The results indicate that the size of the middle class is a strong predictor of Quality 
of Government in democratic countries, but not so in autocracies. Additionally the 
empirical findings show only weak support for an interaction effect, between the 
level of democracy and the size of the middle class, on Quality of Government.  
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1. Introduction 
Today democracy is more widespread than ever before, and now, in the aftermath of 
the Arab spring, 122 countries are electoral democracies. A number which have 
more than doubled since 1989, when there were no more than 60 electoral 
democracies in the world (Freedom House 2014). For long democracy has been 
promoted as a remedy for state mismanagement and as the path towards 
development. While democracy, as a mode of governing, has enjoyed large success – 
and indeed a majority of the world’s best governed and most prosperous countries 
are democracies – for many countries it has failed to deliver on its promises. The 
mixed performances of democracies is manifest in a recent essay in The Economist 
(2014), where the question “What’s gone wrong with democracy?” is in part 
answered by the overreach of democratic government, an inherent shortsightedness 
and leaders inability to fulfill electoral promises.     
For a country to prosper, the state needs not only to be able to hear the will of the 
citizenry, which may best be achieved through democratic institutions, but also to 
be able to realize that will. I.e. a state must have the capacity to deliver the public 
goods desired by the people. Undeniably dysfunctional and corrupt government 
have detrimental economic and societal effects (Rothstein and Teorell 2008), and 
there is an emerging consensus that variation in institutional quality may be the 
most important explanation of differences in development across countries 
(Acemoglu, Robinson et al. 2002,  ersson and  jo stedt     ). It is perhaps sad for 
proponents of democracy that, simply having electoral democracy does not 
necessarily equate in higher Quality of Government1 (from herein after referred to 
as QoG), and even more sad that democracy as a mode of governing, has been found 
to correlate weak, not at all, and even negatively with QoG (Sung 2004). Indeed 
autocracies with seemingly similar preconditions have come to outperform their 
democratic counterparts on several – and in extreme cases on most conceivable – 
                                                        
1 A term borrowed from Rothstein and Teorell (2008) as to describe how well a state utilize 
its’ resources for the public good. In addition to the quality of output, in terms of delivering 
service to its citizenry, the concept also entail that these services are carried out in an 
efficient, non-corrupt way that does not waste the resources of the state. 
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measurements of human development and QoG (Sen 2011). The success of the 
autocratic growth-miracle of China and high living standards in the autocratic city-
state of Singapore poses a challenge to democracy advocates, as countries in Africa, 
the Middle East and South East Asia are considering alternatives to democratic 
governance.  
Empirical research have shown the relationship between democracy and QoG to 
take on a U or a J-shape, implying that democracy contains elements that effects a 
country’s QoG negatively under certain circumstances, and positively under other 
(Bäck and Hadenius 2008). This ambiguous relationship have been explained to be 
dependent upon; the age of the democracy (Keefer 2007, Keefer and Vlaicu 2007), 
the depth of democracy (Bäck and Hadenius 2008) and the wealth of the country 
(Charron and Lapuente 2010). While all intriguing explanations, none is fully 
satisfying. Time itself is no guarantee for development to move in the right 
direction, and while Charron and Lapuente (2010) show that the marginal effect of 
democracy on QoG change – from negative to positive – when  a country move from 
a low to high GDP per capita, they fail to capture the distributional aspects that 
ought to matter. Whether or not the tools available in a democratic state, such as 
elections, political debate, referendums etc., work in favor for QoG should be 
determined by the economic distribution within the state, rather than the overall 
wealth. I propose that the relative size of the middle class may be key to unlocking 
the positive traits of democracy.  
In a democracy, the means of excreting accountability are dependent on that there 
are people who are interested in, and in demand of better governance. To 
incentivize the rulers to provide public goods, these people need to have reached a 
critical mass, so as to pose a credible threat to the rulers. While the rich, who are 
arguably doing well for themselves, are likely to prefer a status quo, and the poor 
are too occupied with day-to-day survival to plan ahead, a critical mass of middle 
class voters may pose this treat.  
Putting our hopes in the middle classes is nothing new. Indeed the middle classes 
have been accredited great achievements in history; it is argued that the industrial 
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revolution took off in England with the help of “great English middle class” (Landes 
1998), made possible through centuries of biological dissemination of middle class 
values throughout the British society and a hard wiring of long-term thinking (Clark 
2007). Already in the Communist Manifesto, Marx and Engels, attributed the 
“unprecedented increase of productive forces” and the reformation of economies 
and politics to the “manufacturing middle class” (quoted in Kenny 2011:1). 
Furthermore the social classification have been expected to be the drivers for 
democracy since the formulation of Modernization Theory (Lipset 1959) – 
democracy came about in part because of the demands from the middle classes for 
political recognition for their increased economic power. 
During the last few years there has been a resurge in the interest in the middle class. 
Development economists are interested in middle class role in the fight to end 
poverty, more so after the disappointment of how little wealth that is trickling down 
from the rich (Birdsall 2010), and economists are closely monitoring the middle 
classes in emerging markets to predict consumer demand (Wilson and Dragusanu 
2008, Kharas 2010). Consequently institutions such as the World Bank and OECD 
have published reports on the middle class (Kharas 2010, Lopez-Calva, Rigolini et al. 
2011). This renewed interest is perhaps best manifested by president Obama’s 
creation of a Middle Class Task Force with the goal of including the middle class in 
the country’s economic expansion (U.S.Gov 2014).  
As for the effects on quality of government, the thought that the middle class 
matters dates, at least, all the way back to ancient Greece: 
“Thus it is manifest that the best political community is formed by citizens of 
the middle class, and that those states are likely to be well-administered, in 
which the middle class is large…” 
- Aristotle 306 BC (quoted in Easterly 2001) 
In this thesis I will bridge two large fields of literature – research on the middle 
classes’ effects on economy and society at large, and the research on regime types’ 
effect on institutional quality – in order to provide a theoretical framework 
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explaining the middle classes’ particular demand of QoG and how this interacts with 
the supply side. Albeit several recent scholars have proposed the link between the 
size of the middle class and levels of corruption and institutional quality (Banerjee 
and Duflo 2008, Birdsall 2010, Kenny 2011), none have, to my knowledge, tested 
this relationship in a large-N study, as will be done in this paper. In addition to 
performing an empirical test I provide an original theoretical explanation of the 
effect of the middle class depending on regime type and the interaction between 
democratic level and the size of the middle class.  
Getting to grip with how and why democracy impact QoG is a particularly salient 
research topic as the world continues to grow more democratic (Freedom House 
2014). Understanding through what mechanisms an increase in democratic level 
can impact QoG negatively, and what threshold need to be overcome for the effect to 
be positive, should therefore not only be of academic value but important for policy 
makers as well. While it is hard to imagine policy prescriptions urging a democratic 
state to either grow old or rich, in order to increase administrative capacity and 
better provision of public goods, there are several available policy tools as regards 
matters of economic distribution. For example, as is currently advocated by Thomas 
Piketty, by introducing wealth tax, and progressive income taxation with a high 
marginal tax rate for top earners (2014).  
1.1 Disposition 
This paper is structured in the following way; first I will go through the large field of 
literature that focus on the effect of regime type on QoG, followed by an extensive 
discussion on the literature explaining the U/J shaped relationship between 
democracy and QoG. Second, I will explain why the size of the middle class may be a 
more satisfying explanation to whether the effect of democracy is negative or 
positive, and discuss the mechanisms at play. Chapter three outlines all the 
methodological aspects of the thesis and provide a review on how the middle class 
can be measured and operationalized.  In chapter four the results from my statistical 
models are presented and analyzed. Chapter five concludes.  
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2. Theory 
The following section outlines previous research regarding the counter-intuitive 
relationship between democracy and QoG, identify the size of the middle class as a 
potential explanatory variable, and build a theoretical argument as to how and why 
the size of the middle class matter. The section concludes with the research question 
and hypothesis that will be investigated and tested.  
2.1 Previous Research 
What has the existing research to say about the effect of regime type on QoG? It 
offers a mixed picture at best. One strand of the literature emphasize that 
democracy have a positive impact on several proxies of QoG, in particular that; 
democracy reduce corruption (Billger and Goel 2009), democracy accompanied by 
press freedom, reduce corruption (Chowdhury 2004) and that universal suffrage, 
competitive elections and checks and balances, determines the strength of property 
rights (Acemoglu, Robinson et al. 2002).  
As a counter to the positive traits of democracy, noble laureate Amartya Sen uses a 
comparative case-study of India and China to highlight the discrepancy between the 
democratic and autocratic regimes, where it becomes evident that autocratic China 
clearly outperforms India, the world’s largest democracy on most indicators of 
human development and well-being (2011). Others have argued that electoral 
democracies allow for more political corruption through vote-buying and illegal 
party financing (Porta and Vannucci 1999). And, Chang, Golden et al. (2007) found 
that electoral accountability has a limited effect on constraining corruption, and that 
corrupt politicians stand in fact a good chance of being re-elected. 
Yet another strand of literature found democracy to have no effect on proxies of QoG 
when looking at: corruption (Brunetti and Weder 2003), female secondary school 
enrollment (Baum and Lake 2003) and economic growth and development 
(Przeworski, Alvarez et al. 2000). 
Despite half a century of testing theories of regime effect on; growth, delivery of 
public goods, corruption etc., there is still no consensus as to how regime type 
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impacts on QoG. This is highlighted by the development of corruption levels across 
countries over the last two decades:   
“Of the    countries that have made significant progress on control of 
corruption since 1996, 12 are electoral democracies—but so are 10 of the 27 
countries where control of corruption has weakened.” – Mingiu-Pippidi 
(2013: 102)  
Clearly not all democracies are equally blessed with the mechanisms that curb 
corruption and enable a state’s administrative capacity. It has been empirically 
proved that the impact of democracy on QoG is not linear, and there are a significant 
number of autocracies that have lower levels of corruption compared to countries 
that have partially democratized (Montinola and Jackman 2002, Sung 2004, Keefer 
2007). Figure 2.1 plot one of the trademark measurements of QoG, Transparency 
International’s Corruption Perception Index, against the level of democracy. For a 
discussion on the measurements see section three.  
Figure 2.1: The relationship between level of democracy and corruption 
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In the top right side corner we find consolidated democracies like the Scandinavian 
countries, New Zealand, Australia, Canada, Japan, where democracy is rated as both 
very free and fair, and where we also observe functioning institutions and high QoG. 
While in the top left quadrant of the graph we find autocratic and semi-autocratic 
regimes like Singapore, Qatar, United Arab Emirates and Malaysia that display high 
levels of QoG, outperforming consolidated democracies, such as Greece, Italy and 
Slovakia. 
Figure 2.1 suggest that – perhaps counter to intuition – democracy affects QoG 
negatively in the early stages of democratization, up to a certain threshold, after 
which the effect of democratization is reversed, to have a positive impact on QoG. In 
other words, the relationship is non-linear.  
Previous research have explained this ambiguous relationship to be dependent on; 
the age of the democracy (Keefer 2007, Keefer and Vlaicu 2007), the depth of 
democracy (Bäck and Hadenius 2008) and the wealth of the country (Charron and 
Lapuente 2010). The following section go into the arguments and explain through 
which mechanisms democracy impact QoG negatively and positively given the 
conditions outlined by the authors, and in the next section outline why the size of 
the middle class may explain the phenomenon better.   
Age of democracy 
Keefer (2007) and Keefer and Vlaicu (2007) are first out to provide an explanation 
as to why: “…in 2004 more than one-third of all democracies exhibited as much or 
more corruption than the median non-democracy.” (Ibid.: 372). The authors argue 
that in a country that has recently democratized, politicians have no or low 
reputation and thus no means of making credible electoral promises to the citizenry. 
The politicians must therefore rely on local patronage networks and provide 
targeted goods to their supporters, in order to attain, and to stay in power. 
Consequently, a society in a young democracy will typically over provide targeted 
goods, such as jobs, public work projects. While at the same time such a society 
would under provide non-targeted goods, such as healthcare, education, protection 
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of property rights etc. (Keefer 2007). The main strengths of the papers are that 
Keefer and Vlaicu (2007) provide and test (Keefer 2007) a theoretical framework 
and mechanisms explaining the non-linear relationship between democracy and 
QoG. As regards weaknesses, a critique to be brought towards the empirical test of 
the latter paper is the author’s operationalization of the mechanism of “reputation 
building”. It is simply proxied by the passing of time since democratization, 
measuring the consecutive years of free and fair elections. Intuitively the passing of 
time is no guarantee for increased reputation and political credibility. In addition 
there are those that argue that credible commitment cannot predate credible 
enforcement (D'Arcy and Nistotskaya 2013). It is not only theoretically plausible 
that a state may become trapped in a vicious spiral, where low QoG cements a low-
trust situation that function as an impediment for reputation-building (at least for 
good reputation), there are also several empirical examples to support this. A case 
in point would be South Africa, where at the time of democratization the ANC 
(African National Congress) enjoyed relatively high support and instead of seeing a 
consolidation of reputation and trust, we have rather seen their reputation erode 
over time (Southall 2008). 
Depth of democracy 
Accepting the notion that time itself doesn’t mean anything but rather what 
development a country experience during that time, Bäck and Hadenius (2008) 
build on Keefer’s (   7) research to test if the depth the democracy is better, than 
age, in explaining differences in states administrative capacity. The authors argue 
that there are two distinct types of governance – steering and monitoring from 
above and from below – that determine a country’s QoG. The first, autocracies are 
particularly apt at by utilizing strict hierarchies and their repressive capacity to 
create an incentive structure preventing officials and bureaucrats from engaging in 
corrupt practices. The latter, democracies are better suited for because of 
mechanisms to exert accountability through regular elections (Bäck and Hadenius 
2008). A country that have lost its ability to govern from above – due to the shift 
from autocracy to democracy – and not yet gained the ability to govern from below 
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will be worse of. A lack of, for example, free media or active voters, which are 
required for the mechanism of bottom-up control to functioning properly, explain 
the bottom arch of the J/U-shaped curve, observed in figure 2.1 – where countries 
scoring in the middle of the democracy index, typically exhibit low levels of QoG. 
Bäck and Hadenius (2008) make a strong case by using time series data, enabling 
for many observations as well as offering a hint of the causal direction. However, 
they fail to provide micro foundations regarding the control and constraints on 
government, and as is pointed out by Charron and Lapuente (2010) the: who, why 
and when, control is exerted remains unanswered. Furthermore, the assumption, 
that both rulers and citizens prefer to improve QoG may not always hold true (Ibid.). 
Wealth of the country 
It is on the idea of changeable preferences that Charron and Lapuente (2010) build 
their argument that: in contrast to the previous authors, it may not always be 
preferable neither for rulers to supply, nor for the ruled to demand QoG. The authors 
create an interesting theoretical framework by merging, an institutionalist 
approach, focusing on the supply side of QoG, with a culturalist approach, concerned 
with the demand from ordinary citizens (the consumers of public goods). Low-
income countries, it is argued, over-value a state which deliver goods for immediate 
consumption, such as patronage jobs or even direct cash transfers distributed 
through clientilistic networks, and typically under-value medium-to-long term 
investments in reforms such as; establishing a meritocratic bureaucracy, upholding 
the rule of law and contract enforcement (Ibid.). With higher levels of economic 
development, however, the need for immediate consumption disappears, allowing 
the citizens to think about and plan for their future. With this follows a change in 
preference, the citizenry will be less impatient to consume, for economists – their 
future discount rate decrease. In response, leaders incentives to provide the reforms 
needed for improving QoG, change as well (Ibid).  
Autocratic rulers on the other hand are not expected to be responsive to the 
citizenry in the same way, but rather follow their interest to maximize their own 
revenues (Olson 1993), thus explaining how autocracies at low levels of economic 
10 
 
 
   
development are enabled to ignore the impatience of the citizenry to provide a 
somewhat higher degree of public goods. Indeed, lest the rulers have access to rents 
from natural resources it may very well lie in their interest to provide some public 
goods – such as QoG – that raise productivity in sectors that they then can extract 
larger rents from. This would also explain why the level of QoG is more rigid in 
autocracies. It should be noted that autocratic leaders only have an incentive to 
improve QoG up to a certain level. For it to be optimal, just below where it becomes 
a constraint on their ability to extract rents from the population (Charron and 
Lapuente 2010). With Singapore as a clear outlier this explains why a majority of the 
world’s top performing countries, in terms of QoG, are democracies.  
The authors test their hypothesis by proxying the impatience to consume, or future 
discount rate, by a country’s wealth, measured in GDP per capita. By creating an 
interaction term between democracy and GDP per capita, Charron and Lapuente 
(2010) show that the marginal effect of democracy on QoG change, from negative to 
positive, when a country move from having low to high income per capita. This is all 
well, however, it must matter how the economic resources are distributed in the 
society. The measurement of GDP per capita fails to capture this. Albeit the authors 
do control for income distribution by testing the impact of the GINI-coefficient, this 
says little about the distribution that may determine whether or not the tools 
available in a democracy can be utilized to achieve better QoG. While the GINI-
coefficient has something to say about the relationship between the very top and the 
very bottom, it does not consider the middle segment of society2. Indeed what ought 
to be of interest is how large proportion of the citizenry has the patience to commit 
to medium- to long-term investments, in relation to those that cannot afford to be 
patient?  
                                                        
2 While the size of the middle class is also a measure of income distribution it differs 
significantly from the GINI-coefficient. To such an extent that in several developing nations, 
for example in China and Ecuador an increase of the size of the middle class has led to a 
higher GINI-score (more unequal) and conversely  in South Africa a decline of the middle 
class resulted in a lower GINI-score (Birdsall 2010). Moreover my measurement of the 
middle class and the World Bank’s Gini Index does not exert a statistically significant 
correlation (see appendix I, table 5).    
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I agree that the leaders’ willingness to provide QoG is contingent on the incentives 
they face, which in a democracy are dependent on the preference of the voters. 
However this mechanism is dependent upon that the rulers – driven by their self-
interest to stay in power – face a realistic threat of losing power, should they not 
provide QoG. A critical mass of middle class voters can pose this threat. For the 
middle class, improved QoG is desirable. The middle class enjoy an economic 
security allowing them to plan for their future. They are often home owners and 
may be the ones to suffer from inadequate property rights, and as small business 
owners the middle class are likely to gain the most from functioning mechanism for 
contract enforcement and dispute-settlements, all considered essential components 
of QoG.   
Evidently, the relative size of the middle class is an overlooked variable in 
explaining the non-linear relationship between democracy and QoG. This 
constitutes a gap in the research on this particularly salient research topic, which 
hold clear academic, as well as, policy value. While it is hard to imagine policy 
prescriptions urging a democratic state to either grow old or rich, in order to 
increase administrative capacity and better provision of public goods, there are 
several available policy tools as regards matters of economic distribution.  
2.2 Theoretical framework – the middle class particularism and QoG 
“The middle class, the large group of households that are neither wealthy 
nor poor… …form the backbone of both the market economy and democracy 
in most advanced societies.”  
– Birdsall, Graham et. al. (2000: 1) 
Today’s high hopes on the middle class as a progressive force in society have its 
historical precedents, dating back to the thoughts of Marx and Engels (1848), and 
Aristotle (306 BC). But what is it that makes the middle class exceptional? And why 
would its size be a determinant for a democratic state’s ability to constrain 
corruption and achieve high quality of government? And how may its size impact 
QoG in non-democracies? To answer these questions we first need to clarify why the 
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middle class would act differently from other social groups, i.e. the rich and the 
poor. Surveying the vast body of literature concerned with the effect of the middle 
class on society at large, I have identified four primary explanations as to why the 
middle class would have a particular demand of QoG differentiating them from other 
social groups. These are outlined below, followed by an explanation of how these 
demands interact differently with the supply-side, the institutional side, in both 
democratic and autocratic states.  
Beyond the horizon 
Firstly, the middle class differs in that their future discount rate is low as compared 
to people living in poverty. Meaning that future returns – say on an investment – are 
not discounted greatly compared to an immediate return. For example, if your 
discount rate is high, when choosing between receiving $10 today or $20 by the end 
of the month – you would go for $10. I.e. you discount the value of $20 by more than 
50 percent when you have to wait a month to receive it. Essentially this has to do 
with a person’s ability to plan and invest in their future – and as I hypothesize – also 
their state’s future. Indeed this is the argument proposed by Charron and Lapuente 
(2010), however, I move their argument forward by proposing that the discount 
rate is of particular interest for the middle class.  Along the avenue of this argument, 
Clark (   7:  56) argues that the biological "hardwiring” of a low future discount 
rate of the English middle class during the 18th century was the key factor for why 
the industrial revolution began in England and not elsewhere. 
There are several reasons for why people belonging to the middle class are less 
likely to discount future gains as heavily as their poorer compatriots; generally it is 
because they enjoy a relative economic security, allowing for room of maneuver 
when it comes to investments. Acemoglu and Zilibotti’s ( 997) argue that the 
possibility to accept more long-term returns is a prerequisite for the engage in 
entrepreneurial activity. Banerjee and Duflo (2008) find that the key factor that 
differentiates the middle class from the poor is their employment situation. The 
middle class are more likely to get paid on a monthly basis, as opposed to the poor 
who are more likely to receive casual pay. It is argued that the knowledge that there 
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is an income arriving at the end of the month, add a time aspect that enable the 
middle class to expand their time horizon when planning for their future, lowering 
their future discount rate. It is this expansion of the time horizon, which makes the 
middle class more prone to plan and invest in their future by prioritizing, for 
example, their children’s education and family healthcare (Ibid). These priorities 
create a demand for a functioning provision of public goods such as schools and 
hospitals (Birdsall 2010). Education is key in the sense that while functioning 
education is indeed one aspect of QoG, it also provides citizen with the tools needed 
to evaluate the performances of officials, thus a requisite to hold them accountable. 
Arguably the poor would benefit from these public goods just as well, but when 
faced with the option of receiving goods for immediate consumption (targeted jobs, 
cash), they are more likely to demand this rather than applying pressure on their 
leaders to provide goods for future consumption. Their demand differs, simply 
because they are struggling to satisfy their basic needs (Charron & Lapuente 2010). 
Surviving today trumps being better off in some distant future. 
There is a division between the poor and the middle class, but how about the rich, 
who arguably have an even lower discount rate than the middle class? Firstly, the 
rich are undoubtedly doing quite well for themselves in the existing systems and 
thus reluctant to alter the status quo.  Second, you can easily imagine the rich elite to 
be oppose governmental reforms as they are likely to be, both employed by, and in 
control of the state (Birdsall 2010), and are likely to fear the empowerment of any 
group outside their own class or ethnic group (Easterly 2001).  
Social contract 
“…[the middle class] is the group that has the sense that government exists 
for it, and shapes its consciousness accordingly.”    
- Lionel Trilling 1945 (Quoted in Philips 1985) 
In other words, a second reason for why the middle class’ demand of QoG would 
differ is connected to their stake in society and the expectations on the state that 
follows. The theory of a social contract between a state and its subordinate builds on 
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Hobbes idea – that citizens give up some of their rights in return for the protection 
of their remaining rights (Hobbes 2008). It has since been developed by 
contemporary political scientists. It is the same theoretical underpinnings that 
govern the expectations on government from people who pay a share of their 
income in tax to the state. Again, as opposed to the poor, the middle class are 
typically in possession of certain assets, such as land, housing, cars, which are 
susceptible to taxation. Additionally formal occupation enable the state to tax the 
middle class’ income to a larger extent then the poor (Banerjee and Duflo 2008). 
And because paying taxes, reinforce a connection, a social contract if you will, 
between the citizenry and the state, the tax-paying middle class will come to expect 
a certain provision of public goods in return. Indeed alienation between the state 
and its citizenry – made possible when a state doesn’t need to tax its population – is 
considered a major element of the natural resource curse, causing resource rich 
countries to remain impoverished and with inadequate QoG (Collier 2007). Several 
development economists and researchers now urge dysfunctional states to tax their 
middle class in order to create a more pervasive social contract, conducive for 
development and the creation of a functioning state (Collier 2007, Birdsall 2012).  
In support of this theory, the OECD’s      Latin American Economic Outlook found 
that the middle class is more likely to consider that people should pay their taxes 
than both the poor and the rich population, and are less likely to consider tax levels 
too high or justify tax evasion. At the same time, the middle class were less satisfied 
with the provision of public goods being provided, then the rich (OECD 2011). While 
the rich also should to be in demand of good schooling and healthcare, they 
generally have the possibility to satisfy this demand through private alternatives 
and thus will not demand the same provision of public goods and QoG.  
The middle way  
“[The middle class] plays a mitigating role in moderating conflict since it is 
able to reward moderate and democratic parties and penalize extremist 
groups”      - Lipset (1959: 78)  
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Thirdly, the middle class is expected to take a mediating role, between the rich and 
the poor, when it comes to several economic policies. Thus avoiding conflict and 
enabling consensus-based solutions on policy, which supposedly are more stable, 
forming a predictable business-friendly climate conducive for economic growth 
(Easterly 2001). As for policy areas, the middle class are thought to side with the 
rich on market friendly ideas and openness to trade, property rights (in part 
because they have assets to protect), while siding with the poor as regards matters 
of economic redistribution (Amoranto, Chun et al. 2010, Birdsall 2012).  
The modern and postmodern values 
Finally, can we expect the values of the middle class to affect their demand for QoG? 
Inglehart and Welzel (2005) find that as societies grow wealthier their values shift 
toward “self-expression values”, like freedom of speech, tolerance and trust (2005), 
and with it, the citizens build an repertoire of actions to take in order to achieve 
these values (Welzel and Inglehart 2008). This theoretical argument is supported 
empirically by a PEW research project on global attitudes, that found people 
belonging to the middle class significantly more likely to consider a fair judicial 
system, a free press, and freedom of speech, as “very important”, when compared 
with their fellow poorer citizens (PEW 2009).  
In another perspective the middle class role as consumers is highlighted, as their 
value for quality and safety enable them to pay a little bit extra, which in turn drives 
product differentiation and investments in production of new goods (Murphy, 
Schleifer et al. 1989).  It is upon this that much hope is placed on the emerging 
middle classes in Asia, as to replace, or complement, the middle classes in North 
America and Europe to drive global demand for consumer goods (Kharas 2010). 
Whereas this might feel disconnected from a country’s QoG, it is not necessarily so. 
We can call this Shopping for QoG. Products of higher standard does not only have to 
pass internal quality controls, but demand a rigorous state apparatus that make 
sure the producers comply with safety regulations, environmental standards etc. 
While of course no one would like the plastic toy their kids occasionally chew on, to 
contain carcinogenic toxics, it is plausible that reaching a certain welfare standard 
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makes you more prone to care about the products you consume. In other words, 
when the middle class have overcome the immediate threats to a happy life – facing 
the poor – they would focus on the next threats. When it comes down to it, you need 
a functioning state to handle several of these threats.  
It should be noted that the PEW Global Attitudes (2009) study bunt together the 
middle class and the rich, and indeed it is unlikely that the rich prefer toxic toys, 
why in terms of values, Kenny (2011) may be right in that there is no or only weak 
support for a “middle class particularism”. And that the gradual shift of values with 
income, only put middle class values in between the ones of the rich and the poor 
population (Ibid.). Whether or not this is true matters little for three previous 
mechanisms proposed, as there is still theoretical support as to why the rich would 
have a different demand of QoG than the middle class, despite sharing a similar set 
of values. QoG is simply not a prerequisite for the rich to satisfy their needs.   
Supply-side in democracies and autocracies 
Based on the mechanisms above I argue that there is support for a “middle class 
particularism” when it comes to their demand of QoG. This demand would not differ 
depending on the regime they live in. But how does the middle class’ demand for 
QoG interact with the institutions available in democracies and autocracies? It is 
reasonable to believe that the way that the demand interacts with the supply side, is 
different because of the different institutional natures, thus generating different 
effects on QoG. 
Clearly, the possibility to utilize the tools that a democracy offers to increase QoG, 
are dependent upon the size of the population that is in demand of reforms that can 
produce these outcomes. Freedom of expression and a free media works as tools 
through which the citizens demands can be voiced, thus there is a bottom up 
information channel available, and possibility to rule from below (Bäck and 
Hadenius 2008). Indeed the middle class has been found to be more in favor for 
democracy (PEW 2009), and more politically active than both their poorer and 
richer countrymen (Amoranto, Chun et al. 2010). As a workhorse model of 
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democracy, the median voter theorem, predict that the median voter will utilize 
their democratic powers to redistribute wealth towards themselves, as well as vote 
for policy and a provision of public goods of most benefit for her (Alesina and 
Rodrik 1994). How well democracy works to increase state capacity and the 
provision of public goods depends on the relative size of the voting populations that 
are in demand of it, and prepared to vote accordingly.  
“…if elites are not under strong domestic pressure to make these 
[democratic] institutions effective, they are likely to corrupt them, rendering 
democracy ineffective.”   
 – Welzel and Inglehart (2008: 130) 
I.e. it matters greatly if the median voter is middle class. Of course, voicing concerns 
and requesting reforms could be done even in a democratic country where the 
middle class is small, however, it will likely fall on deaf ears. When it comes to 
excreting accountability through elections the majority of the electorate may still 
support the candidates who have secured support through patronage, clientilistic 
networks and targeted goods, over those who advocate for reforms (Charron and 
Lapuente 2010, Keefer 2007). Additionally, in a democratic system, the elite can 
resort to funding of political parties, think tanks, lobby and pressure groups in order 
to maintain the current state of affairs and to uphold de facto power in response the 
challenge to their de jure power that democracy pose (Piketty 2014: 533). An even 
more direct way to capture democracy is through vote-buying, which the middle 
class is likely more resistant to than the poorer population because of their lower 
discount rates. As the world’s largest democracy is currently heading to the polls, 
stories are rife of direct vote-buying3. The Election Commission of India (2014) 
writes, in a checklist to police officers to keep an eye for: 
“…[political] candidates indulging in various methods to induce the voters, 
which include outright payment of cash that amounts to bribery and other 
                                                        
3 See The Economist (2014) and The Guardian (2014)  
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forms of inducements such as supply of liquor, food packets, holding of lunch 
and dinner parties…”   
A quick google search on “India vote buying” generates about 9  million hits, 
whereas the equivalent search for the US lands a mere 6 million hits. Of course a 
google search holds no scientific value, but it may none the less be a hint on the 
extent of the problem in the two countries. Thus where the median voter is in 
demand of short-term kickbacks and targeted goods, rather than long-term 
institutional reinforcing reforms, the later will not come about.   
On the other hand, when the size of the middle class is sufficiently large, the demand 
can affect the supply. Thus the middle class need to reach a critical mass in order to 
pose a credible threat to rulers so that, in turn, their incentives to supply higher QoG 
are altered. When it is suddenly possible for politicians to run for office, by 
promising and, at least partly, delivering on reforms that enhance the public goods 
provision and overall institutional capacity in the long run, they may well start to do 
so (Keefer 2007, Charron and Lapuente 2010), and once this possibility of steering 
and monitoring from below is in place a democratic state is expected to deliver 
higher QoG (Bäck and Hadenius 2008).  
How do the middle class interact with the supply side in autocracies? While the 
middle classes living in autocratic states may have a similar demand for QoG, they 
cannot exert their will through (meaningful) elections, thus there are no available 
exit options through which they can dispose of corrupt leaders (Charron and 
Lapuente 2012). Furthermore autocracies provide less means for citizens both to 
voice their demands on QoG, and to monitor the state, because of limitations on 
freedom of speech and a partly effective media censorship. But there may be other 
tools available.  
At a dinner party in Shanghai, I was discussing the value of village elections in China 
together with a woman – arguably middle class – who had happily sold her vote in 
the elections of her home village for enough money to buy her “a new smart phone 
or the latest tablet”. While some commentators have seen the cost of vote buying in 
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a positive vain and argued that the relative high price of buying votes means that 
there is power to be acquired through these elections – perhaps a seed that can 
grow in the future (Kennedy 2010). Others, and indeed my fellow dinner guest 
reason, that piece meal elections is not an effective way of exerting accountability in 
an otherwise autocratic society. Firstly, the expectation that all potential candidates 
would act similar in enriching themselves through lucrative land deals is 
discouraging. But perhaps even more important is that there are other tools at hand. 
Due to the information revolution there are more tools at the disposal for concerned 
citizens than ever before in history, also in autocratic states (Qiang 2011). Is it 
possible that the users of these can account for the variation in levels of QoG across 
autocratic states? Why, in particular, may we expect a higher level of QoG in 
autocratic states where the middle class, the ones likely to utilize the new tools, is 
large, than in states where the middle class is small or non-existent? 
Last year, a reasonably high ranking official in Shaanxi, China was convicted of 
corruption, after concerned citizens had begun to post pictures of the official, 
wearing watches, he should not have been able to afford on his governmental 
paycheck (Lie 2013). “Brother Watch”, as the official became known, is in no way 
alone. Examples are several where social media users, have brought on the downfall 
of officials and bureaucrats, through sharing pictures and conducting full blown 
investigations online (Qiang 2011). While incidents like these can perhaps work to 
thwart some corruption, they are unlikely to have a significant effect on corruption 
levels nationwide. Although by voicing concern and their will, citizens can at least 
let the regime know its preferences.  As The Economist (2014) points out: “… [the] 
regime’s obsession with control paradoxically means it pays close attention to 
public opinion”, thus working as an information-channel to the leaders of the will of 
the people, enabling them to, at least in less sensitive cases and when not 
challenging vested interests, cater to the needs and will of the people. China is 
estimated to have around 500 million social media users, and the government is 
estimated to employ close to 2 million people to monitor their activity (BBC 2013). 
Primarily employed to censor harmful opinions, but clearly the government 
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sometimes picks up, and acts on what is trending. Although on a different scale we 
see the same mechanism at play in other autocratic states such as Singapore, 
Vietnam, and Cambodia.  
What I argue is that, it is not the availability of the tools themselves that is key, but 
rather the demand of QoG. Social media is just a platform through which this 
demand can be articulated, and in some cases picked up by government as 
something to deliver upon. Similarly to the logic of Olson’s (1993) “stationary bandit 
theory” – that autocratic rulers have incentives to provide some QoG to its subjects, 
Barro (1999: 159) argue that: 
“In some models, an autocrat would voluntarily relinquish some authority—
for example, by establishing a constitution, empowering a legislature, 
expanding voting rights, and extending civil liberties—in order to deter 
revolution and to encourage the private sector to invest (and, thereby, to 
expand the pie that the government can tax).”  
However well autocracies can perform, we are still faced with the empirical fact that 
all countries – except Singapore – on the top end of the QoG-ladder are well 
consolidated democracies. This suggests that there are inherent problems in 
autocratic states that constrain QoG to surpass a certain level.  In other words, the 
supply will only partly satisfy the demand. This is illustrated by figure 2.2 that show 
a rough estimation on the prediction of the level of QoG in democracies and 
autocracies depending on the size of the middle class. 
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Figure 2.2 Predicted level of QoG in democratic and autocratic states depending on size of the middle 
class 
In democracies the level of QoG is expected be responsive to the size of the middle 
class, whereas this relationship is less elastic in dictatorships. Olson’s ( 996) theory 
predicts that an autocrat will only provide public goods up to a level where an 
additional unit would constrain his ability to govern, which would make his piece of 
the pie smaller. Thus an autocratic ruler would be very unresponsive to the middle 
classes’ demand after a certain level of QoG.  
For example when it comes to rule of law – autocratic states have great difficulty in 
depersonalizing political authority (Gerring, Bond et al. 2005), which is the very 
difference between rule of law and rule by law. The former a key trait of QoG. 
Because of this, in autocracies, utilizing the available tools may be a balancing act 
not to overstep into what the state cannot tolerate and thus risk facing the 
repressive power of the state. It is possible that the long-term thinking associated 
with a higher demand of QoG, may also be accompanied by a “long-term fear”, where 
one associated with the middle class may fear to descend from this relative security. 
Perhaps to such an extent that one would refrain on articulating his/her demand for 
QoG.    
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As with several phenomena in social research, the issue of reversed causality must 
be addressed. In the case that high QoG cause economic growth, and to the extent 
that growth functions as a “tide that lifts all boats”, it follows that the middle class 
would expand due to an increase in institutional capacity. While noting the 
possibility of causality running in this direction, and indeed the likelihood of a 
reinforcing virtuous circle, the mechanisms presented above largely theorize the 
causality to run from the size of the middle class to QoG. Thus an increase in the size 
of the middle class will result in an increase in demand, which depending on the 
elasticity of the supply side will increase the provision of QoG.   
2.4 Research question and hypotheses 
From the discussion above we arrive at the following research question – How does 
the size of the middle class affect QoG, and can it account for the non-linear 
relationship between democracy and QoG? This thesis will take a deductive, theory 
testing approach. To help in this endeavor the following hypotheses will be tested:  
H1: The size of the middle class has a positive impact on the level of QoG. 
H2: The size of the middle class has a weaker effect on QoG in non-democracies than 
in democracies.  
H3: The effect of democratic level on QoG is negative/weak in countries with small 
middle classes and positive/strong in countries with large middle classes.  
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3. Data and methods 
Section three discusses the operationalization of my variables, with a focus on how to 
measure the middle class, where I argue that cars per capita minus the elite, can serve 
as a proxy for the middle class. In addition it accounts for why a cross-sectional and 
time-series regression analyses are particularly apt in testing my hypotheses, as well 
as discusses strengths and limitations with the data.  
3.1 Dependent variable – Quality of Government 
As with any abstract concept, Quality of Government is difficult to capture. The 
definition “how well a state utilizes it resources for public goods” (Rothstein and 
Teorell 2008) imply not only final output in terms of delivering service to its 
citizenry but also that these are carried out in an efficient, non-corrupt way that 
doesn’t drain the resources of the state. A few studies have used “hard” measures to 
capture the effect of corruption on QoG, for example the number of court cases 
dealing with corruption or the conviction rate of these cases (Goel and Nelson 
1998). There are, however, grave concerns for the validity of such measurements as 
they are likely to measure the effectiveness of the legal system rather than 
corruption, and indeed would fail to capture the reality in countries where 
corruption is endemic. Given this, the majority of studies concerned with corruption 
and QoG make use of “soft”, perception based measures, where the population and 
country experts are asked to rate the country on certain indicators (Kaufmann, 
Kraay et al. 2008).  
In this thesis I will use the Government Effectiveness from the World Bank’s 
Worldwide Governance Indicators. It aggregates perceptions of; quality of public 
service provision, the quality of bureaucracy, the independence of the civil service 
from politics, and competence of civil servants into a measurement ranging from -
2.5, representing low QoG, and +2.5 representing high QoG (Kaufmann, Kraay et al. 
2008). The variable is continuous and normally distributed. For simplicity and to 
make the graphs more comprehensible when visualizing the data, the variable is 
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rescaled by adding  .5 to each country’s score, thus changing the variables range to 
0, representing low QoG and 5 representing high QoG.  
The main benefit of using this proxy instead of the International Country Risk 
Guide’s (ICRG) QoG Indicator, as used by Charron and Lapuente (2010), and Bäck 
and Hadenius (2008), or Transparency International’s (TI) Corruption Perception 
Index (CPI) is availability. The indicator has observations for 191 countries as 
compared to 139 for ICRG and  84 for TI’s C I. It should be noted that these three 
proxies of QoG, correlate significantly at > 0.9 (see Appendix I, Table 1). Because of 
the availability of scores for relatively large number countries, the TI’s proxy will be 
used as a robustness check in the cross-sectional analysis.  
3.2 Independent variables 
For the variable democracy, I use an aggregated measurement combining Freedom 
House and Polity IV democracy-score into a single measurement ranging from 0 to 
10. By using the imputed version, where missing Polity IV scores have been 
regressed using the average of the Freedom House score, more observations are 
available. In addition Teorell and Hadenius (2005) have shown that this combined 
measurement outperform the individual variables as regards validity and reliability 
(Teorell, Charron et al. 2013).  
In addition to the level of democracy I employ a binary division of regime type 
composed by Cheibub, Gandhi & Vreeland (2010), to visualize the different effect of 
the middle class in democracies and non-democracies. A regime is classified as a 
democracy if “the executive and the legislature is directly or indirectly elected by 
popular vote, multiple parties are allowed, there is de facto existence of multiple 
parties outside of regime front, there are multiple parties within the legislature, and 
there has been no consolidation of incumbent advantage ” (Teorell et. al. 2013) 
To test for the hypotheses of previous research, on the non-linear relationship 
between democracy and QoG, I control for the following variables; GDP per capita, 
as well an interaction term between GDP per capita and democracy (Charron and 
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Lapuente 2010); democracy squared (Bäck and Hadenius 2008); and years of 
democracy (Keefer 2007).   
In addition I control for a set of variables that have been used in previous studies as 
predictors of different proxies of QoG. These are; ethnic fractionalization (Easterly 
2001), where a higher score represents higher ethnic and linguistic 
fractionalization; openness to trade (Sandholz & Gray 2003), measured as exports 
plus imports divided by GDP per capita; oil and gas export (Ross 2012); and income 
inequality (Li et. al. 20  ) using the World Bank’s Gini Index, where a score of 0 
represents perfect equality, and 100 represent perfect inequality.  
3.3 Explanatory variable – The middle class 
Who is middle class and how can we measure it across countries? Thus far there 
exists no consensus on how to best define the middle class. Is it a set of values that 
best define a household’s belonging to this social strata, or an absolute or relative 
level of income? Broadly speaking we are searching for those who have the ability to 
live a somewhat comfortable life without an overwhelming risk of falling into 
poverty, i.e. those who have a low future discount rate.    
In defining the middle class there are two primary divisions, either a definition that 
is absolute on the global scale, or one definition relative for each country or region 
(Kahras 2010). A few authors have used a relative approach in defining the middle 
class, for example Easterly (2001) define the middle class as those between the 20th 
and 80th quintile, i.e. the middle 3/5 of the population. There are clear drawbacks of 
such a definition for the purpose of this thesis. Firstly it doesn’t capture the size of 
the middle class in relation to the rest of the population as the size will always be 
constant. Rather it is used to capture how much of the wealth that is owned or how 
much of total income that is earned by this middle segment of society. Second it 
includes the poor and thus say nothing meaningful about the economic security, 
which I argue may be the very constrain on whether or not a household are in 
demand of QoG and thus can afford to hold their leaders accountable. Furthermore, 
as (Kenny 2011) points out, it is hard to imagine any policy prescriptions that will 
enlarge any relative definition of the size of the middle class, and hence such a 
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definition isn’t very action-oriented.  Although I’m not necessarily undertaking this 
research with the goal of prescribing any policies, a relative definition is not suitable 
as I am interested in the effect different sizes of the middle class may have on QoG. 
Other researchers have tried to define the middle class with absolute measures of 
household income or consumption levels (relative in the sense that they consider 
values in PPP $). This is done by setting a lower limit for what constitutes being 
middle class, and a higher limit, after which a household is considered rich. Table 3.1 
indicates the lack of consensus in this undertaking.  
Table 3.1 Existing definitions/identifications of the middle class 
Author/s Lower limit Upper limit Focus 
Easterly (2001) 20th quintile 80th quintile World 
Milanovic and Yitzhaki 
(2001) 
$ 12 $ 50 World 
Banerjee and Dufflo (2008) $ 2 $ 10 Developing world 
GoldmanSachs (2008) $ 16 $ 80 World 
Kahras (2010)  $ 10 $ 100 World 
Ravallion (2009) $ 2 $ 13 World 
Birdsall (2010) $ 10 95th quintile Developing world 
Lopez-Calva et- al. (2011) $ 10 $ 50 Latin America and the 
Caribbean 
Dadush and Ali (2012) Car ownership None Developing world 
The definitions vary widely, for example Milanovic and Yitzhaki (2001) use the 
mean income level of Brazil, at $12, as the lower limit and the mean income for Italy, 
at $50, as the upper cut off point and identify the global middle class as households 
earning between these income levels. On the other hand Banerjee and Dufflo (2008), 
and Ravallion (2009) use the World Bank’s poverty level, at $2, as the lower limit 
and $10 and $13, respectively as upper limit. Consequently there is no overlap 
between the middle class population identified by Milanovic and Ytzhaki (2001) and 
that identified by Banerjee and Dufflo (2008) and only a small overlap with the 
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population identified by Ravallion (2009). This is further illustrated in Table 3.2, 
which display the size of the middle class in five developing nations measured in 
millions of people, and the population percentage within brackets.  
Table 3.2 Size of middle classes in millions of people, middle class proportion of society within brackets,  
generated from different definitions for the year 2009.  Author’s calculations using PovcalNet (2014), 
and data from Dadush and Ali (2012).  
Author/s Brazil China India Mexico South Africa 
Milanovic and 
Yitzhaki (2001) 
47 
(24,4) 
76 
(5,6) 
6 
(0,5) 
26 
(23,1) 
7 
(14,5) 
Banerjee and Dufflo 
(2008) 
105 
(54,5) 
860 
(64,2) 
368 
(30,5) 
71 
(62,9) 
23 
(48,14) 
Kahras (2010) 66 
(33,9) 
115 
(8,6) 
9 
(0,8) 
36 
(32,2) 
10 
(19,9) 
Birdsall (2010) 61 
(31,5) 
71 
(5,3) 
2 
(0,2) 
32 
(28,2) 
9 
(18,4) 
Ravallion (2009) 124 
(64,3) 
910 
(67,9) 
373 
(30,8) 
84 
(74,1) 
26 
(53,8) 
Dadush and Ali 
(2012) 
84 
(43,5) 
107 
(7,9) 
71 
(5,8) 
82 
(72,3) 
19 
(38,9) 
 
When using absolute values to measuring the size of the middle class it is common4 
to utilize the World Bank’s  ovcalNet-tool, which enable you to calculate the 
proportion of the population that are living under any given monthly income or 
consumption level. You can then the calculate proportion of society living within an 
interval (the middle class), by subtracting the percentage living under your lower 
limit, from the percentage living under your upper limit. The analysis tool provided 
by PovcalNet uses data from over 800 household surveys, carried out in 126 
developing countries, to estimate distributional parameters and average monthly 
                                                        
4 See for example: Birdsall (2010), Kahars (2010), Ravallion (2009) 
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household income or consumption for the years 1981 to 2010, converted into 2005 
PPP dollar (PovcalNet 2014)5.  
Yet another way of measuring the middle class is through subjective social class 
measures, used by Amoranto et. al. (2010). Such self-identifications are available for 
52 countries in the World Value Survey’s sixth wave. Apart from the low number of 
available countries, another problem with self-identification measures are, that in 
developed countries a large share categorize themselves as working class (34 
percent of the Finns and 31 percent of the Germans) however a large part of them 
are still likely to enjoy enough economic security to be able to plan for their future, 
and thus are expected to be in demand of QoG (WVS 2014).  
From the discussion above it is evident that any definition of the middle class will be 
arbitrary in one way or another. It thus comes down to identifying the one definition 
which best suit the explanatory mechanisms of the phenomenon you seek to 
explain. For this thesis none of the above is ideal. A better dividing line, between 
those who have long and those who have short time horizons, may be their 
possibility to consume non-essential goods.  
Dadush and Ali (2012) propose that the amount of passenger cars in circulation can 
be used as a direct measurement of the middle class in developing countries. I 
would argue that for the threshold described above, it is useful for the developed 
world as well. Passenger cars certainly constitute non-essentials. They are 
significantly expensive items, which ownership separates one from the poorest 
strata of society. Of course the proxy may overstate the middle class as some 
households may purchase more than one car. On the other hand other households 
may choose not to purchase a car, despite being able to afford it.  
 Another concern is that the measurement also includes the rich elite. Dadush and 
Ali (2012) argues that because the rich are typically very few, in developing 
countries, it does not matter much whether or not you include them when 
                                                        
5 For an in-dept description of methodology and data availability of the PovcalNet analysis 
tool, see Chen and Ravallion (2010)   
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estimating the size of the middle class. This is all very well, however, adding an 
upper limit is – at the very least – theoretically logical. In societies where large 
shares of the “non-poor” are rich, the will of the rich is likely to prevail. Adding an 
upper limit of the identification could be done by, for example, deducting luxury cars 
from the measurement, or simply following Birdsall’s example, and use the 95th 
quintile as cut off between the middle class and the rich (2010). While “there is no 
empirical evidence to assume in any particular country a household at the 96th 
percentile of per capita income or consumption is more reliant on income from 
capital or privileges or “rents” broadly speaking than a household at the 94th 
percentile” (Birdsall 2010: 7), it is nevertheless theoretically satisfying to include an 
upper limit. For some countries the cut off for those gaining from a status quo, i.e. 
have no demand QoG, may be higher than the 95th percentile, it could well be that 
you’d have to belong to the top one or two percent of the population to gain from a 
corrupt system.  
While noting that the operationalizing of any abstract concept is an art of squaring a 
circle in an acceptable way, I propose the size of the middle class to be equal to the 
amount of passenger cars per 100 persons, minus five, to deduct the elite.  
Two caveats should be added. Firstly, while I will talk about the size of the middle 
class as a percentage of the population it is rather a value lower than the actual 
percentage. For example it is reasonable to believe that everyone living in a 
household that can afford to purchase a non-essential item such as a car would have 
long time horizons. Perhaps the best way of coping with this would be to multiply 
the cars per 100 persons with the average household size, as is indeed suggested by 
Dadush and Ali (2012). Unfortunately the available data for average household size 
covers only limited number of countries and few observations over time. Another 
option to arrive closer at the actual percentage would be to simply multiply the 
number of cars per 100 persons by two, implying that for every car there are two 
middle class citizens. As this would not change the variance and thus not any of the 
results in the analyses I stick with the original value. Second because some countries 
have no, or a middle class below five percent, their value after subtracting the rich 
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will be negative. Instead of recoding those values to zero I keep the negative values, 
thus maintaining the variance in the data, which can represent the dominance of the 
rich, and to what extent they are unchallenged by a middle class.  
Data on the amount of cars per capita are taken from the World Bank’s World 
Development Indicator Passenger cars6. For the cross-sectional data observations 
was collected for the year 2009 with a span of +/- 3 years. To maximize the number 
of countries included, when missing, data for an additional 13 countries7 was 
collected from the World Development Indicator Motor Vehicles, which in addition 
to cars include busses and freight vehicles. Thus this indicator is slightly larger and 
may overstate the size of the middle class somewhat, albeit for poor countries such 
as the 13 countries undoubtedly are, the difference is marginal. For the panel data I 
use the values for the years 2005, 2008 and 2011. To achieve a balanced panel, 
where a value was missing the value for the closest available year was imputed, and 
in where there were two values at an equal distance in time their average value was 
imputed.  
One strength of the variable is its intuitive appeal, it is easy to picture that a person 
who can afford to purchase a non-essential such as a car enjoy some economic 
security, i.e. are middle class. But the main strength is that data is available for most 
countries in the world. A weakness to be brought towards the measurement would 
be that because it is consumption based, there is a risk that it captures the same 
socioeconomic aspects as the variable GDP per capita does. If this was true it would 
be problematic as wealth measured as GDP per capita is one of the contending 
theories which I position this study against (Charron & Lapuente 2010). However it 
isn’t, which will becomes clear in the empirical section where GDP per capita and 
my proxy are showed to capture quite different aspects (see table 4.1).    
                                                        
6 “Passenger cars refer to road motor vehicles, other than two-wheelers, intended for the 
carriage of passengers and designed to seat no more than nine people including the driver” - 
World Bank (2014) 
7 Benin, Democratic Republic of Congo, Equatorial Guinea, Gabon, Ghana, Grenada, Lesotho, 
Malawi,  Mauritania, Micronesia, Papua New Guinea, Trinidad and Tobago 
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To test the validity of my operationalization, that I actually measure what I claim, I 
employ Birdsall’s definition of the middle class as a second proxy for the middle 
class in the cross-sectional analysis. The data on the size of the population living 
above $10 per day was obtained through the PovcalNet, from which I then 
subtracted the population living in and above the 95th income quintile. Again, 
instead of recoding the negative values to zero, the values are kept to maintain the 
variance in the data. It should be noted that operationalization of the middle class 
correlate significantly with Birdsall’s operationalization at .8 4 (see Appendix I 
Table 5).  
3.4 Methods  
To test my three hypotheses, I first examine the relationship between the key 
variables visually. Bivariate to address hypothesis one, that the middle class have an 
positive impact on QoG, and then in multivariate graphs to examine the relationship 
between the middle class and QoG depending on regime type, addressing hypothesis 
two, that the size of the middle class has a weaker effect on QoG in non-democracies 
than in democracies.  
To statistically determine my hypotheses I employ several ordinary least squares 
(OSL) regression analyses that creates models that fit the included data the best. 
Mathematically, in a bivariate model, it is matter of finding a line which minimizes 
the sum of distances from all observations to this line. Multivariate we can imagine a 
plane. From this the fit of the model can be calculated, so that we have estimation of 
how much of the variance in the dependent variable that the independent variables 
can account for. By comparing both within models and between models the impact 
of each independent variable is estimated (Field 2013). 
To test the third hypothesis, that the effect of democratic level on QoG is 
negative/weak in countries with small middle classes and positive/strong in 
countries with large middle classes, I create an interaction variable by multiplying 
the size of the middle class with the level of democracy. A significant interaction 
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effect between the variables would yield a statistically significant result in the 
following model (Brambour, Clark et al. 2006):   
QoG = a + b1 Dem + b2MC + b3MC*Dem + e 
Where; a is the intercept, b1 effect of democracy, b2 the effect of the size of the 
middle class and b3 size the of the interaction effect. Additionally the cross-sectional 
regression allow me to test for competing theoretical explanations of the 
relationship between democracy and QoG, as well as for other known determinants 
of QoG. Furthermore I employ the TI’s C I as a proxy for QoG in a robustness check.   
As the maxim haunting social science researchers goes “correlation does not imply 
causation”, I cannot claim a causal effect between the independent and dependent 
variables by examining their relationship at a specific point in time. Simply because 
the relationship at a cross-section is not dependent on the causal direction. To 
address this issue I perform a time-series regression analysis and draw upon 
previous studies (eg. Charron and Lapuente 2010, Bäck and Hadenius 2008) and 
measure all independent variables at t – 1, so that the model take into account that 
input (IV), predates the output (DV). This is theoretically logical as – in all but 
instantaneous systems – the present affect future outcomes, and present outcomes 
are dependent on the past. While appreciating the arbitrariness of any specific 
amount of time lag, I settle for following in the footsteps of the previously 
mentioned authors using one year. 
The time series model use balanced data for 128 countries, for the years 2005, 2008 
and 2011, resulting in 384 observations. Because of the rigid nature of institutions, 
it would have been preferable to conduct a time series analysis over one, or even 
two decennia. However data for WDI Cars per 1000 persons, are only available from 
   4 and onwards, and doesn’t allow for analysis over a longer time span. This 
should be taken into consideration, and causal claims should therefore only be done 
with caution. The data is balanced, meaning that there are an equal number of 
observations for each unit, thus no one unit exert an undue influence on the model 
due to an uneven number of available observations. 
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Descriptive statistics of the cross-sectional data are available in appendix I, table 2. 
And for the panel data see Appendix I, table 3. Please see Appendix II for case-wise 
diagnostics of outliers and test for the assumptions of the linear regression models.  
All variables, unless otherwise specified, are taken from the Quality of Government 
Institute’s dataset (Teorell et. al.    3). All analyses in this thesis are performed in 
IBM SPSS.  
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4. Empirical findings 
In this section I present and discuss the results from my statistical models, starting 
with a basic overview and visualization of the data. Second I perform a cross-sectional 
regression analysis to see how the size of the middle class and my interaction term 
performs in competition with previous research, as well as checking for the robustness 
of my model. Finally I take on the issue of reverse causality, the arch nemesis of 
statistically significant relationships, and perform a time series regression, where the 
independent variables are measured at t - 1, giving a hint about the causal direction.  
So what does the data say about the effect of the size of the middle class on QoG? 
Figure 4.1 plots the rescaled WB’s Government Effectiveness score against my 
operationalization of the middle class for the year 2009. At a glance there seem to be 
a correlation and a clear linear relationship between the variables.   
 
The plot also reveals a few weaknesses in the operationalization of the size of the 
middle class. While it is nothing exceptional that Singapore turn out as a statistical 
misfit in cross country data, here it is more likely due to fact that an 
Figure 4.1 The relationship between the size of the middle class and QoG 
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operationalization based on cars per capita will fail to capture the reality in a city 
state such as Singapore. Also the famously bike-friendly nation of Denmark is 
accredited a smaller middle class then Lebanon, likely because of the populations 
preference for non-motorized two-wheelers. Nevertheless the measurement’s 
positive aspects, the large number of observations and intuitive appeal, outweigh 
these measurement problems.  
In the bottom left corner we observe numerous countries, with a negative size of the 
middle class. Here we find all countries that have less than 5 cars per 100 persons. 
Here the middle class is non-existent, leaving the rich to rule unchallenged.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 4.2 show that there indeed seem to be a linear effect of the size of the middle 
class on QoG, when countries are grouped into having either; no, a small, a medium 
or a large middle class8, offering empirical support to the hypothesis that the size of 
                                                        
8 Coded as:  No = <0, Small = 0 to 20, Medium = 20 to 40 and Large = >40 generating groups 
of 50, 53, 27 and 47 countries in respective group. See appendix I, table 4 for descriptive 
statistics. 
Figure 4.2 Mean value of QoG depending on size of the middle class 
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the middle class has an positive impact on QoG. Because we see a lot of dispersion in 
the data in figure 4.1 we will move forward by exploring this relationship in yet 
another dimension, by adding a binary division of regime type, as shown in figure 
4.3 The visualization shows a linear relationship between the size of the middle 
class and QoG in both democracies and autocracies. As predicted, while both 
positive, the coefficient of this relationship is larger for the former and smaller for 
the latter, giving support to the second hypothesis of this thesis  – that the size of the 
middle class have larger impact on QoG in democracies, and smaller positive impact 
in autocratic countries. 
 
See Annex I, table 4, for descriptive statistics for respective group 
Not too surprising, the highest QoG is found in the group of countries which are both 
democratic and boost a large middle class. Here we find for example the 
Scandinavian countries, Australia, Slovenia, the US, Canada, where the middle class, 
because of its size are likely to constitute the median voter. On the other side of the 
Figure 4.3 QoG as a function of the size of middle class and regime type 
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spectrum, the lowest level of QoG is found in autocracies where there exists no 
middle class, such as in Laos, Eritrea, North Korea and 28 additional low performers.  
Particularly interesting are the groups with small middle classes, where the group of 
autocracies slightly outperforms the democratic group, although because of 
overlapping confidence intervals this cannot be statistically determined. In the 
democratic group we find countries where the small middle class have limited 
means of perusing their demand through the democratic institutions. Here we find: 
Armenia and Moldova where oligarchs have traditionally dominated the political 
sphere (Petrosyan 2013), Thailand where political the dynasties compete for power 
by populist politics (Bohane 2009), and Nigeria where political power is de facto 
reserved for the country’s elites (Campbell 2013). In the autocratic group, the 
countries provide on average an equal or higher QoG, perhaps primarily driven by 
the rulers incentive to maximize their rents (Barro 1999, Charron and Lapuente 
2011). This would be the case for Syria, prior to the outbreak of civil war, and to a 
large extent in China. In the latter however, due the population size, even a small 
middle class equals a large group in absolute numbers, and with some tools 
available to voice their demands (Qiang 2011). 
In countries where the size of the middle class is either medium or large, the 
democratic groups enjoy an on average higher QoG then their autocratic 
counterparts. For example, while autocratic Bahrain which has a middle class on par 
with that of the Netherlands, just over 40 percent, the demands of the middle classes 
are met more adequately in the Netherlands, which score 4,25 on the WB’s level of 
QoG while Bahrain score 3.10. A similar difference can be observed between Ireland 
and Kuwait where the middle class make up 38 percent of the population, but where 
the former enjoy a QoG of 3.82, while the latter only score 2.6. In general there are 
indications that the level QoG is influenced by the size of the middle class, but that 
this relationship varies depending on the regime in which they live. 
While these examples are primarily illustrative, Figure 4.4 shows to what extent the 
relationship between the size of the middle class and QoG is linear for democracies 
and dictatorships. As the graph indicates there exists a strong linear relationship 
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between the size of the middle class and QoG in democracies (R2 = .734), whereas in 
dictatorships the relationship is weaker (R2 = .271). 
Figure 4.4 Linear relationships between the size of the middle class and QoG  
 
Modeldemocracy  QoG = 2.1 + 0.040 * Size of the middle class 
Modeldictatorship  QoG = 1.8 + 0.034 * Size of the middle class 
From these bivariate regression models we can derive that in democracies, an 
increase in the size of the middle class of 10 percent results in a 0.4 increase in QoG, 
whereas the same increase in a dictatorship is predicted to increase the level of QoG 
by 0.34. Such a small difference would offer only weak support to the hypothesis 
that the effect of the size of the middle class on QoG is stronger in democracies than 
in dictatorships. More interesting, however, is the fit of the model. For democracies 
the high R2 of 0.734 indicate that the model is a good fit for the data, while for 
dictatorship the low R2 of 0.271 indicate that the model is a poor fit of the data. Thus 
the size of the middle class alone, can only account for 27 percent of the variance of 
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QoG in dictatorships, which inevitably leaves us wondering what variables accounts 
for the remaining variance.  
The two regression models in table 4.1 provide an additional test for the second 
hypothesis - that the effect of the middle class is stronger in democracies than in 
non-democracies - by controlling for additional independent variables.  
Table 4.1 Cross-section regression analysis testing H2 
 
In model 1 the size of the middle class remains strongly significant in predicting 
QoG, when controlling for an additional set of independent variables. It is of 
particular interest the middle class holds in competition with GPD per capita, a 
variable strongly related to QoG. This indicates that in democracies it is not only the 
overall wealth that determines the level of QoG, but also how this wealth is 
distributed in society. Furthermore the significant effect of years of democracy, 
suggest that democracy benefits from maturing when it comes to its effect on QoG. 
 
Model: 
Democracy 
1 
Autocracy 
2 
MC size 
 
.017*** 
(.004) 
.009 
(.009) 
GDP per capita 
 
.362*** 
(.075) 
.364*** 
(.110) 
Years of Dem  
 
.009*** 
(.002) 
 
Oil and gas export 
 
-.040 
(.019) 
-.063* 
(.027) 
Openness to trade 
 
.000 
(.001) 
.030 
(.308) 
Ethnic fractionalization 
 
.017 
(.221) 
.002 
(.002) 
Constant 
 
-.965 
(.077) 
-1.097 
(.863) 
R
2 
.841 .494 
Observations 96 64 
Multivariate OSL regression analysis displaying unstandardized beta coefficients and standard errors 
within parentheses.  Dependent variable is the World Bank’s Government Effectiveness (0-5), higher 
scores representing higher QoG.  
Legend: *p<.05 ** p<.01 ***p<.001.  
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Model 1 should be considered a very good fit of the data as it can account for 84 
percent of the cross country variance of QoG in democratic states.   
In model 2, the size of the middle class falls out of significance, while GDP per capita 
remain significant. In addition high oil and gas exports are negatively related to the 
level of QoG in autocratic states while insignificant in democratic state. Because only 
49 percent of the variance is explained by the model, there are clearly additional 
explanations of what affect QoG in autocratic states.  
To take an example from the data, the four countries, Trinidad and Tobago, Slovenia, 
Oman and Bahrain, all have a similar level of GDP per capita ($23 000 +/- $1 000). In 
democratic Trinidad and Tobago, the 30 percent large middle class enjoy a QoG of 
2.80, while in democratic Slovenia the 47 percent large middle class live in a state 
providing a QoG of 3.66. Counter to this relationship, in the two autocratic countries 
Oman and Bahrain, where the middle class make up only 11 percent of the 
population in the former, and 40 percent in the latter, boost almost the same level of 
QoG (3.08 and 3.10). 
While these countries of course provide nothing more than illustrative examples, 
the two regression models do indicate that in democratic countries it matters more 
for QoG, how wealth is distributed in society, than it does in non-democratic 
countries. This suggest that there is a disconnect between the supply and demand 
side in autocratic countries, and that the level of QoG is determined by other 
mechanisms. Perhaps by the ruler’s self-interest in increasing the size of the pie 
from which they then can extract larger rents (Olson 1996, Barro 1999). 
Moreover, and indeed very important, the models show empirically that my proxy 
for the middle class and GDP per capita do in fact capture different socioeconomic 
aspects, as GDP per capita remains significant in model two, whilst the size of the 
middle class doesn’t.     
In table 4.2 the binary division of regime type is removed in favor for a variable of 
the level of democracy. Thus the effect of democratic level, as well as an interaction 
between democratic level and the size of the middle class can be tested.   
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 Table 4.2 Cross-sectional regression testing H1 and H3 
 
 
Model # 
Baseline 
Proxy 1 
1 
Interaction 
Proxy 1 
2 
Baseline 
Proxy 2 
3 
Interaction 
Proxy 2 
4 
GDP p.c. 
 
5 
Charron & 
Lapuente 
6 
Bäck & 
Hadenius 
7 
Keefer 
 
8 
Control 
 
9 
Robustness 
check 
10 
Democracy .086*** 
(.016) 
.090*** 
(.018) 
.091*** 
(.018) 
.075*** 
(.020) 
.086*** 
(.014) 
-.218* 
(.105) 
-.006 
(.073) 
.057*** 
(.017) 
.060** 
(.023) 
.149*** 
(.037) 
MC size .035*** 
(.003) 
.038*** 
(.008) 
  .017*** 
(.004) 
.012** 
(.004) 
033*** 
(.003) 
031*** 
(.003) 
.028*** 
(.005) 
.075*** 
(.006) 
MC size * Dem 
 
 .000 
(.001) 
        
MC Birdsall’s 
proxy 
  .013*** 
(0.02) 
.001 
(.006) 
      
MC Birdsall’s 
proxy * Dem 
   .002* 
(.001) 
      
GDP p.c.     .340*** 
(.049) 
.183* 
(.072) 
    
GDP p.c. *Dem
 
     .034** 
(.012) 
    
Dem
2 
      .009 
(.007) 
   
Years of Dem        .011*** 
(.003) 
  
Openness trade         .001 
(.001) 
 
Ethnic fract.         -.385 
(.228) 
 
Oil/Gas Export         -.006 
(.019) 
 
Gini Index         .013* 
(.006) 
 
Constant 1.484*** 
(.100) 
1.466*** 
(.110) 
1.395*** 
(.114) 
1.480*** 
(.120) 
-1.267*** 
(.416) 
.157*** 
(.636) 
1.666*** 
(.172) 
1.533** 
(.097) 
1.207*** 
(.290) 
2.182*** 
(.234) 
R
2 
.695 .695 .450 .468 .757 .769 .698 .730 .639 .634 
N (Countries) 177 177 124 124 170 170 177 166 80 173 
Multivariate OSL regression analysis for a cross-section for the year 2009. Dependent variable for model 1 to 9 is the World Bank’s Government Effectiveness (0-5) and for model 10 
Transparency International’s Corruption Perception Index (0-10), higher scores representing higher QoG. 
Legend: *p<.05 ** p<.01 ***p<.001. Standard errors within parentheses  
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Model 1 test the explanatory power of the level of democracy and the size of the 
middle class. Both variables gains significance, indicating that QoG is higher in 
countries where the democratic level is high and the size of the middle class is large. 
The model explains close to 70 percent of the variance of QoG across countries, and 
must be seen as a good fit of the data. Moreover the standardized beta coefficient9 
for the size of the middle class is approximately 2.5 times larger than the coefficient 
for democracy suggesting that the middle class is the stronger predictor of the level 
of QoG, than democracy. 
In model 2 I add an interaction term, to test if the effect of democracy on QoG is 
contingent on the size of the middle class, which cannot fully be captured by the 
binary division of regime typed used in figure 4.3 and 4.4, and table 4.1. Both the 
level of democracy and the size of the middle class remain strongly significant 
offering empirical support to hypothesis 1 that - the size of the middle class has a 
positive impact on QoG. However the interaction term is not significant, thus 
offering no support to the third hypothesis – that the effect of the level democracy 
on QoG is dependent of the size of the middle class.   
Model 3 and 4 replicate the previous models using Birdsall’s proxy for the middle 
class. Noting the considerable difference in the R2 it is apparent that my proxy can 
account for 23-24 percent more of the variance in QoG across countries, 
furthermore we can note the large difference in available observations, with 53 
more countries included for my proxy. While model 3 resemble the results of model 
1, offering support of the validity of my operationalization, model 4 does not. Model 
4 exhibit a weak significant relationship between the interaction and QoG, in 
support of the third hypothesis. From the methods section we remember that my 
proxy and Birdsall’s proxy for the middle class correlate closely at > .8 4, indicating 
that the different results in model 2 and 4 are primarily driven by omitted 
observations in the latter model, rather than that the proxies captures 
fundamentally different groups. Furthermore, the omitted observations are mainly 
                                                        
9 Standardized beta values for all models and variables in table 4.2 are found in Appendix I, table 6 
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developed nations (not available in the PovcalNet database), which suggests that for 
developing nations there may be an interaction effect between the size of the middle 
class and democratic level, whereas this interaction disappears when developed 
nations are included in the sample.   
Model 5 and model 6 tests for the theory of Charron and Lapuente (2010) – that the 
effect of democracy on QoG is dependent on the overall wealth of a country – and 
while their results remain robust, the size of the middle class remains significant, 
indicating that in addition to the wealth of a country it does matter how the wealth 
is distributed. While table 4.1 showed GDP p.c. and my proxy for the middle class to 
indeed capture different socioeconomic aspects there are reason to interpret the 
coefficients in model 5 and 6 with care. This is due to the high correlation between 
the independent variables GDP per capita and the size of the middle class. Thus 
there may be an issue of multicollinearity at hand, which limits the possibility to 
separate the unique effect from each independent variable in the model (Brambour, 
Clark et al. 2006).  
In model 7 I control for Bäck and Hadenius’ (   8) theory that – the impact of 
democracy is dependent on the level of democracy in itself. When controlling for 
democracy squared the size of the middle class remains significant while neither, 
democracy or democracy2 are significant, implying that the size of the middle class 
is a greater predictor of the level of QoG than democratic level.  
Model 8 tests Keefer’s (   7) hypothesis, which receives support in the model, 
albeit both democracy and the size of the middle class remain significant. Moreover 
the latter have a standardized beta coefficient (.571) more than double that of the 
two former (.235 and .177) indicating that the middle class is the strongest 
predictor of QoG in the model.  
Model 9 include four control variables out of which only the GINI-index is 
significant, at the weakest level.  Interestingly the sign of the beta value suggest that, 
somewhat counterintuitive, a higher inequality predicts a higher QoG. If this reflects 
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the situations where a rising middle class contributes to rising inequality is only 
speculation at this point. It should be noted than when including the GINI-index the 
number the number of observations are reduced greatly, due to a lack of data. 
Running model 7 excluding the GINI-index enable for 169 observations and produce 
a very similar result, with the exception that openness to trade is significant at the 
p<.01 level. 
Model 10 provides a robustness check testing the reliability of my model. The 
results remain robust both when the dependent variable, is substituted with 
Transparency International’s Corruption  erceptions Index, another common proxy 
for QoG. The amount of variance explained by the model is only marginally lower (6 
percent) than in model 1.  
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Table 4.3 Time-series regression analysis testing robustness and causal claim 
 
 
Model # 
Baseline 
 
1 
Interaction 
 
2 
GDP p.c. 
 
4 
Charron & 
Lapuente 
5 
Bäck & 
Hadenius 
6 
Keefer 
 
7 
Control 
 
8 
 
Democracy .088*** 
(.011) 
.076*** 
(.013) 
.080*** 
(.010) 
-.290*** 
(.078) 
-.093 
(.059) 
.050*** 
(.012) 
.064** 
(.022) 
 
MC size .033*** 
(.002) 
.027*** 
(.006) 
.013*** 
(.002) 
.008** 
(.003) 
.030*** 
(.002) 
.030*** 
(.002) 
.031*** 
(.003) 
 
MC size * Dem 
 
 .000 
(.001) 
      
GDP p.c.   .390*** 
(.036) 
.180** 
(.056) 
    
GDP p.c. * Dem
 
   .041*** 
(.009) 
    
Dem
2 
    .016** 
(005) 
   
Years of Dem      .010*** 
(.001) 
  
Openness trade       .003*** 
(.001) 
 
Ethnic fract.       -.426* 
(.185) 
 
Oil/Gas Export       -.001 
(.013) 
 
Gini Index       .013* 
(.006) 
 
Constant -.875*** 
(.077) 
-.855*** 
(.087) 
-4.045*** 
(.306) 
-2.136*** 
(.498) 
-.473** 
(.149) 
-.801*** 
(.074) 
-1.295*** 
(.277) 
 
R
2 
.685 .687 .756 .770 .693 .720 .716  
Countries 
Observations 
128 
384 
128 
384 
125 
374 
125 
374 
128 
384 
128 
384 
80 
208 
 
Multivariate OSL Regression analysis with for the years 2006, 2008 and 2011. Dependent variable is the World Bank’s Government Effectiveness 
(-2.5 to 2.5), higher scores representing higher QoG. All independent variables are measured at t - 1.  
Legend: *p<.05 ** p<.01 ***p<.001. Standard errors within parentheses 
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By and large the results from time-series regression analysis in Table 4.3, resembles 
the results from the cross-sectional regression in Table 4.2, indicating that the 
previous results are robust. The effect of the size of the middle class remains 
strongly significant when controlling for competing hypotheses in respective 
models. Like before, the interaction term between the size of the middle class and 
democracy is not statistically significant. As opposed to the cross-sectional 
regression, model 6 offers support to Bäck and Hadenius’ (   8) hypothesis, 
furthermore the control variables openness to trade and ethnic fractionalization is 
significant in the panel data, as opposed to in the cross-section data.    
Although we cannot fully solve the issue of reverse causality the results from time-
series regression offer – in addition to the theoretical mechanisms – some reason to 
believe that causality may run from the independent variables, in the direction of 
the dependent, as the values of the independent variables predates the dependent 
by one year. Thus, the findings in this first large-N study on the effect of the middle 
class on QoG, suggest that an increase in the size of the middle is expected to cause 
increase in QoG. However, the results should be interpreted with care as the time-
series only examine relationship over a period of seven years. And indeed there is a 
likelihood of a reinforcing virtuous circle between the size of the middle class and 
QoG.  
4.1 Summary of results 
What can we say about my three hypotheses after testing them empirically?  
Firstly, H1 - that the size of the middle class impact QoG positively, is supported, by 
the results in all regression models in table 4.2, when controlling for other plausible 
variables. Moreover these results were consistent in the models in table 4.3, where 
all independent variables where lagged by one year, suggesting that causality may 
run in the hypothesized direction. 
Second, when testing H2 – that the size of the middle class has a weaker effect on 
QoG in non-democracies than in democracies, the relationships was examined in a 
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binary division of democracy/autocracy. The findings show this relationship to be 
very strong in democratic states, even when controlling for GDP per capita and 
years of democracy. In autocracies, however, the relationship was found to be 
weaker and could only account for a small variance in the dependent variable. When 
faced with control variables the size of the middle class was no longer statistically 
significant in predicting the level of QoG in autocratic states. Rather GDP per capita 
and oil and gas exports accounted for the cross country variance of QoG.  
While the demand of QOG is likely to be similar for middle classes irrespective of in 
which country they live, the supply side is more responsive in democratic countries. 
In addition – and indeed very important – because that the size middle class is 
significant in democratic countries but not so in autocratic (and GDP per capita is 
significant for both regime types) it is evident that the two variables capture 
different socioeconomic aspects. This further validates my operationalization of the 
middle class, making it suitable to be employed in future research.  
Thirdly, H3 - that the effect of democratic level on QoG is negative/weak in 
countries with small middle classes and positive/strong in countries with large 
middle classes, did only receive weak empirical support, when employing Birdsall’s 
proxy for the middle class (table 4.2, model 4). The same model employing my 
operationalization did not yield any significance for the interaction variable, but did 
so for the middle class and democracy level separately. Because the Birdsall’s proxy 
only included observations for developing nations it could be that there is an 
interaction effect between the size of the middle class and democratic level at a 
certain development stage. However due to the low significance this finding 
shouldn’t be emphasized without additional tests and the inclusion of control 
variables.     
Lastly, the time-regression offer an initial indication that causality may run from the 
independent variables towards the dependent. However until tested over a longer 
time span, any causal claim should be done with caution.   
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5. Conclusion 
As a point of departure this thesis used the mixed findings of previous research on 
the effect of regime type on QoG, and took the middle class along for the drive. The 
middle class offered an extensive body of literature that, previously, had only 
qualitatively and theoretically linked its size to QoG. This was clearly an untapped 
source. I have bridged these two fields of literature by creating a theoretical 
framework, explaining the mechanism through which the middle classes’ particular 
demand interacts differently with the institutional side in democratic and autocratic 
states, to impact QoG.  
The empirical findings indicate that the size of the middle class positively affect QoG 
in democratic states. A finding that hold when controlling for GDP per capita, the age 
of democracy, and other contending variables. Furthermore the results suggest that 
in autocracies, the middle class is neither as strong nor as precise a predictor of QoG 
as in democracies. When controlling for additional variables, the middle class was 
no longer a significant predictor of QoG in autocracies. These findings offer initial 
support to my theoretical model which predicts that the middle classes’ demand – 
driven by low future discount rates, expectations on the state, the middle class’ 
mitigating role between the upper and lower class, and their values – interacts 
differently with the supply side in democracies and autocracies because of the 
regime types’ different institutional natures. The results also justified the study in 
retrospect, as indeed there are indications that in addition to the overall wealth, in 
democracies, it also matters how this wealth is distributed.  
Moreover the results emphasize the disconnect between the supply and demand 
side of QoG in autocratic states. Although there are channels of information and a 
limited tool-set available in autocracies, this is not sufficient. In addition, in 
autocracies it is possible that the long-term thinking associated with a higher 
demand of QoG may also be accompanied by a “long-term fear”, where a person in 
the middle class may fear to descend from their relative economic security, and thus 
refrain from articulating his/her demand for QoG.  
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The results offer, at best, weak support for the last hypothesis - that the middle class 
is a determining factor for the impact of democracy on QoG. An interaction term 
between the size of the middle class and the level of democracy was only found to 
show a weak significance, and only for developing nations in the analysis. Thus the 
interaction would need to face further empirical scrutiny, before any claims could be 
made.   
The academic implications of this thesis are clear. Firstly, the novel 
operationalization of the middle class (using passenger cars suggested by Dadush 
and Ali (2012) and deducting the elite), is strengthened by the results, because the 
variable falls out of significance in predicting QoG in autocracies while GDP per 
capita does not. Thus this proxy can be employed in future research concerned with 
the impact of the middle classes. Second, by theoretically and empirically connecting 
the size of the middle class to the level of QoG, I have carried out an initial test on a 
relationship that warrants further attention. As is common in any research 
endeavor, despite answering a few questions, in sum, I have ended my journey with 
more questions than at departure. Could disaggregating the theoretical framework, 
reveal which mechanism impact QoG the most? And similarly, are there certain 
aspects of QoG that are especially responsive to the demands of the middle class? 
Evidently I have but contributed with one small piece to a very large puzzle.  
As regards implications outside of academia one should be cautious with drawing 
policy prescriptions from a study of a previously untested relationship. However, if 
the findings are proven robust in future research – and given the positive societal 
outcomes associated with a high QoG (Rothstein 2011) – strengthening the role of 
the middle classes deserves a position on the global development agenda.  
To conclude, this thesis offers empirical support to what Aristotle pointed out some 
twenty-three-hundred years ago. Political communities where the middle class is 
large are indeed well-administrated. At least when they are democratic.   
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Appendix I 
Additional tables referred to in the main document.  
 
Table 1 Correlation DV variables (QoG) 
 TI  WB ICRG 
TI Corruption Perception Index 
Pearson correlation 
N. 
 
1*** 
181 
 
.939*** 
181 
 
.906*** 
139 
WB Government Effectiveness 
Pearson correlation 
N. 
 
.939*** 
181 
 
1*** 
191 
 
.929*** 
139 
ICRG Quality of Government 
Pearson correlation 
N. 
 
.906*** 
139 
 
.929*** 
139 
 
1*** 
139 
*p<.05 ** p<.01 ***p<.001 
 
 
 
Table 2 Descriptive statistics for cross-section data 
Variable N Mean Minimum Maximum Standard deviation 
QoG – WB  191 2.437 .23 4.79 .992 
QoG – TI CPI 181 3.982 1.01 9.40 2.089 
Regime Type 192 .61 0 1 .488 
Democracy 193 6.673 .00 10.00 3.105 
MC Size  178 12.46 -4.94 70,04 19.25 
MC Size*Democracy 178 112.3 .00 700.3 2121 
MC Birdsall 124 11.27 -5.0 86.89 21.36 
MC Birdsall * Democracy 124 93.74 -40.0 837.7 183.1 
Democracy2 193 54.12 .00 100.0 36.84 
GDP (log) 179 8.742 5.72 11.13 1.258 
GDP*Democracy 179 58.52 .00 107.42 29.57 
Years of democracy 171 18.16 0 70 21.59 
Trade Openness 185 89.09 1.96 401.5 47.52 
Oil and gas export (log) 193 2.104 -2.54 9.39 2.949 
GINI Index 85 40.64 26.00 65.77 9.084 
Ethnic fractionalization 187 .438 .00 .93 .257 
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Table 3 Descriptive statistics for panel data 
 
 
Table 4 Mean of QoG for size of middle class in democracies and autocracies 
Size of middle class Regime type Mean N Std. Deviation Std. Error of Mean 
No 
Dictatorship 1,5130 31 ,49142 ,08826 
Democracy 1,8636 19 ,33858 ,07768 
Total 1,6462 50 ,46853 ,06626 
Small 
Dictatorship 2,1399 24 ,81507 ,16638 
Democracy 2,0926 29 ,56004 ,10400 
Total 2,1141 53 ,68065 ,09350 
Medium 
Dictatorship 2,3351 9 ,69748 ,23249 
Democracy 2,7715 18 ,52111 ,12283 
Total 2,6260 27 ,60926 ,11725 
Large 
Dictatorship 3,0064 6 ,62706 ,25600 
Democracy 3,7869 41 ,54121 ,08452 
Total 3,6872 47 ,60561 ,08834 
Total 
Dictatorship 1,9616 70 ,79115 ,09456 
Democracy 2,8154 107 ,96283 ,09308 
Total 2,4777 177 ,98943 ,07437 
 
Variable N Mean Minimum Maximum Std. deviation 
QoG – WB 565 -,0641 -2,34 2,36 ,99930 
Democracy 575 6,6462 ,00 10,00 3,12765 
MC Size 396 15,4919 -5,00 109,63 21,27535 
MC 
Size*Democracy 575 53,9374 ,00 100,00 36,87784 
Democracy2 528 8,6981 5,58 11,21 1,28881 
GDP (log) 531 58,9877 ,00 112,12 31,61208 
GDP*Democracy 575 53,9374 ,00 100,00 36,87784 
Years of 
democracy 
585 19,7556 ,00 80,00 22,66107 
Openness to trade 550 90,9735 1,89 418,97 48,03129 
Ethnic 
Fractionalization 
559 ,4402 ,00 ,93 ,25651 
GINI-Index 240 44,2050 20,54 69,71 7,10843 
Oil and gas export 
(log) 
585 1,8589 -4,44 9,51 2,90441 
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Table 5 Correlation of independent variables (correlations of particular interest are highlighted) 
 Dem. 
MC 
Size 
MC 
Size * 
Dem 
Birdsall 
MC  
Birdsall 
MC * 
Dem Dem
2 
GDP 
p.c. 
(log) 
GDP pc 
* dem 
Years 
of Dem 
Open. 
trade 
Oil/Gas 
exp log 
Gini 
Index 
Ethnic 
fract. 
Dem Pearson 
Correlation 1 ,505
**
 ,601
**
 ,430
**
 ,527
**
 ,978
**
 ,364
**
 ,967
**
 ,603
**
 ,016 -,294
**
 ,180 -,331
**
 
Sig.   ,000 ,000 ,000 ,000 ,000 ,000 ,000 ,000 ,830 ,000 ,099 ,000 
N 193 178 178 124 125 193 179 180 171 185 193 85 187 
MC Size Pearson 
Correlation ,505
**
 1 ,957
**
 ,804
**
 ,805** ,591** ,802
**
 ,653** ,602** ,162* ,129 -,206 -,372** 
Sig ,000  ,000 ,000 ,000 ,000 ,000 ,000 ,000 ,033 ,087 ,064 ,000 
N 178 178 178 120 121 178 170 171 166 174 178 82 173 
MC Size * 
dem 
Pearson 
Correlation ,601
**
 ,957
**
 1 ,751
**
 ,825
**
 ,683
**
 ,713
**
 ,746
**
 ,676
**
 ,124 ,044 -,206 -,400
**
 
Sig.  ,000 ,000  ,000 ,000 ,000 ,000 ,000 ,000 ,102 ,557 ,064 ,000 
N 178 178 178 120 121 178 170 171 166 174 178 82 173 
Birdsall MC 
definition 
Pearson 
Correlation ,430
**
 ,804** ,751
**
 1 ,941
**
 ,497
**
 ,720
**
 ,579
**
 ,162 ,186
*
 ,074 -,043 -,356
**
 
Sig ,000 ,000 ,000  ,000 ,000 ,000 ,000 ,080 ,038 ,412 ,699 ,000 
N 124 120 120 124 124 124 123 123 117 124 124 82 118 
Birdsall MC 
* Dem 
Pearson 
Correlation ,527
**
 ,805
**
 ,825
**
 ,941
**
 1 ,598
**
 ,674
**
 ,666
**
 ,167 ,189
*
 ,001 -,010 -,326
**
 
Sig ,000 ,000 ,000 ,000  ,000 ,000 ,000 ,071 ,036 ,991 ,932 ,000 
N 125 121 121 124 125 125 123 124 118 124 125 82 119 
Dem
2 
Pearson 
Correlation ,978
**
 ,591
**
 ,683
**
 ,497
**
 ,598
**
 1 ,459
**
 ,978
**
 ,641
**
 ,031 -,249
**
 ,145 -,389
**
 
Sig. ,000 ,000 ,000 ,000 ,000  ,000 ,000 ,000 ,677 ,000 ,186 ,000 
N 193 178 178 124 125 193 179 180 171 185 193 85 187 
GDP p.c. 
(log) 
Pearson 
Correlation ,364
**
 ,802** ,713** ,720** ,674** ,459** 1 ,567** ,547** ,268** ,311** ,077 -,461** 
Sig. ,000 ,000 ,000 ,000 ,000 ,000  ,000 ,000 ,000 ,000 ,485 ,000 
N 179 170 170 123 123 179 179 179 165 179 179 85 173 
GDP p.c. 
(log) * dem 
Pearson 
Correlation ,967
**
 ,653
**
 ,746
**
 ,579
**
 ,666
**
 ,978
**
 ,567
**
 1 ,698
**
 ,043 -,178
*
 ,174 -,412
**
 
Sig.  ,000 ,000 ,000 ,000 ,000 ,000 ,000  ,000 ,563 ,017 ,111 ,000 
N 180 171 171 123 124 180 179 180 166 179 180 85 174 
Years of 
Dem 
Pearson 
Correlation ,603
**
 ,602
**
 ,676
**
 ,162 ,167 ,641
**
 ,547
**
 ,698
**
 1 ,024 ,093 ,474
**
 -,338
**
 
Sig.  ,000 ,000 ,000 ,080 ,071 ,000 ,000 ,000  ,760 ,228 ,000 ,000 
N 171 166 166 117 118 171 165 166 171 169 171 81 169 
Openness 
to Trade 
Pearson 
Correlation ,016 ,162
*
 ,124 ,186
*
 ,189
*
 ,031 ,268
**
 ,043 ,024 1 -,129 -,048 -,139 
Sig. ,830 ,033 ,102 ,038 ,036 ,677 ,000 ,563 ,760  ,081 ,663 ,064 
N 185 174 174 124 124 185 179 179 169 185 185 85 179 
Oil/gas exp 
log 
Pearson 
Correlation -,294
**
 ,129 ,044 ,074 ,001 -,249
**
 ,311
**
 -,178
*
 ,093 -,129 1 ,083 ,089 
Sig.  ,000 ,087 ,557 ,412 ,991 ,000 ,000 ,017 ,228 ,081  ,449 ,223 
N 193 178 178 124 125 193 179 180 171 185 193 85 187 
Gini Index Pearson 
Correlation ,180 -,206 -,206 -,043 -,010 ,145 ,077 ,174 ,474
**
 -,048 ,083 1 ,100 
Sig.  ,099 ,064 ,064 ,699 ,932 ,186 ,485 ,111 ,000 ,663 ,449  ,374 
N 85 82 82 82 82 85 85 85 81 85 85 85 82 
Ethnic frac. Pearson 
Correlation -,331
**
 -,372
**
 
-
,400
**
 
-,356
**
 -,326
**
 -,389
**
 -,461
**
 -,412
**
 -,338
**
 -,139 ,089 ,100 1 
Sig.  ,000 ,000 ,000 ,000 ,000 ,000 ,000 ,000 ,000 ,064 ,223 ,374  
N 187 173 173 118 119 187 173 174 169 179 187 82 187 
**. Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed).*. Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed). 
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Table 6 Standardized beta values for the cross-section regression analysis (table4.2)
 
 
Model # 
Baseline 
Proxy 1 
1 
Interaction 
Proxy 1 
2 
Baseline 
Proxy 2 
3 
Interaction 
Proxy 2 
4 
GDP p.c. 
 
5 
Charron & 
Lapuente 
6 
Bäck & 
Hadenius 
7 
Keefer 
 
8 
Control 
 
9 
Robustness 
check 
10 
Democracy .270*** .280*** 
 
.374*** .308*** .268*** -.648* -.019 .177** .242* .220*** 
MC size .664*** .718***   .316*** .222** .623*** 
 
.571*** 577*** .662*** 
MC size * Dem 
 
 -.061         
MC Birdsall’s 
proxy 
  .418*** .038       
MC Birdsall’s 
proxy * Dem 
   .435*       
GDP p.c.     .441*** 
 
.238*     
GDP p.c. *Dem
 
     1.103** 
 
    
Dem
2 
      .316 
 
   
Years of Dem        .235*** 
 
  
Openness trade         .043  
Ethnic fract.         -.138 
 
 
Oil/Gas Export         -.323 
 
 
Gini Index         .181* 
 
 
R
2 
.695 .695 .450 .468 .757 .769 .698 .730 .639 .634 
N  177 177 124 124 170 170 177 166 80 173 
Multivariate OSL regression analysis for a cross-section for the year 2009. Dependent variable for model 1 to 9 is the World Bank’s Government Effectiveness (0-5) and 
for model 10 Transparency International’s Corruption Perception Index (0-10), higher scores representing higher QoG. 
Legend: *p<.05 ** p<.01 ***p<.001.  
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Appendix II 
Respective regression models in table 4.1 have been tested replicated with removed 
outliers (std. residuals +/- 2) generating almost identical the results to the full samples. 
No variable gain or falls out of significance in the replicated models. Thus we can 
conclude that the models are all acceptable in fitting the data (Field 2013). The models 
containing the full sample are presented in the paper. This appendix outlines all 
diagnostics and assumption tests for regression model 5 in table 4.1., which can be seen as 
the a key model containing the independent variable, size of the middle class, GDP per 
capita and level of democracy.  
 
Table 1 Casewise Diagnostics DV WB QoG 
Country Name Std. Residual WB QoG Predicted Value Residual 
Belarus -2,139 1,35 2,3823 -1,03295 
Comoros -2,006 ,73 1,7036 -,96868 
Denmark 2,305 4,79 3,6792 1,11284 
Equatorial Guinea -3,142 ,78 2,2975 -1,51692 
Lebanon -2,520 1,92 3,1355 -1,21646 
Libya -2,172 1,31 2,3610 -1,04845 
Rwanda 2,187 2,32 1,2689 1,05608 
Singapore 3,980 4,77 2,8440 1,92152 
Comment: Only two countries have a standardized residual above the cut off value of +/- 3 (Singapore and 
Equatorial Guinea), and when using a the cutoff of +/-  2 as suggested by Field (2013) another 6 countries 
exhibit turn up to be misfits for the statistical model. However a replication of the model excluding the 8 cases 
generate an almost identical result with only very minor changes in the unstandardized beta coefficient 
 
Table 2 Assessing multicollinearity 
 Tolerance VIF 
Democracy ,760 1,317 
Size of middle class (%) ,312 3,203 
GDP p.c. log ,356 2,807 
Comment: The tolerance values far from the limit of < .2. The VIF values for the size of the middle class and GDP 
p.c. are quite high why there are some cause for concern for multicollinearity. In addition we recall the two 
variables to correlate significantly at .802 for multicollinearity which should be taken into consideration when 
interpreting the coefficients in the regression models.  
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Figure 1 Assumption of homoscedasticity holds  
 
 
Figure 2 Normally distributed residuals 
 
 
 
 
